

Message Text

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2525
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0657

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR: SECOND SOVIET BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET
REPS OF DECEMBER 1, 1977

REF: MBFR VIENNA 653, DTG 021256Z DEC 77

1. AFTER RECEIVING WORD ON MARGINS OF THE DECEMBER 1
PLENARY FROM SOVIET DEP REP SHUSTOV THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT
EXPECT INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE MODALITIES OF THE EXCHANGE
OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE PRESENT ROUND, US REP REQUESTED
DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REP WHICH TOOK PLACE LATER SAME DAY.
US DEP REP AND SOVIET DEP REP SHUSTOV WERE ALSO PRESENT.

2. US REP SAID SHUSTOV HAD INFORMED US REPS THAT THE
SOVIET DELEGATION HAD RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THE MODALITIES
OF PRESENTING AIR MAN POWER DATA DIVIDED BETWEEN MAJOR FORMATIONS
AND OTHERS. SHUSTOV HAD ALSO STATED THAT IT WAS NOT LIKELY
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THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD RECEIVE SUCH INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE THE END OF THE ROUND. SHUSTOV HAD STATED THAT THE
ISSUE WAS AN OPEN ONE AS FAR AS THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WERE
CONCERNED, THAT NO NEGATIVE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKE NOT TO
DIVIDE AIR MANPOWER AND THAT THE UNDERLYING FACTOR WAS THAT
THIS WAS A DIFFICULT, TECHNICAL QUESTIONS AND TOOK A GREAT
DEAL OF TIME. TO JUDGE FROM THESE REMARKS, PRESUMABLY ONE

WOULD HAVE A DECISION ONLY IN THE NEXT ROUND OR LATER.

3. TARASOV CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD UP TO THE PRESENT RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE MODALITIES OF AIR MANPOWER EXCHANGE. IF AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD HAVE HAD AN ANSWER MUCH EARLIER. THE SOVIET DELEGATION AGREED WITH THE PROPOSAL, BUT THE DIFFICULTY IN MOSCOW MIGHT THEORETICALLY BE ONE OF PRINCIPLE REGARDING THE DIVISION AS WELL AS ONE OF TECHNICAL DIFFICULTY. A DECISION WAS UNLIKELY BEFORE THE NEXT ROUND BECAUSE IT WAS NOT ONLY A QUESTION OF THE SOVIETS OWN DECISION BUT REQUIRED TIME-CONSUMING COORDINATION WITH SOVIET ALLIES.

4. US REP SAID THIS WAS A MOST UNFORTUNATE DEVELOPMENT IN VIEW OF THE SHORT TIME LEFT TO THE END OF THE ROUND. WESTERN REPS HAD ALREADY REPORTED THE SOVIET'S INFORMAL SUGGESTION TO THEIR AUTHORITIES AND POSSIBLY MIGHT HAVE MOVED BEFORE THE END OF THE ROUND. THE RESULT WAS A REAL PROBLEM BECAUSE PARTICIPANTS HAD LOST A LOT OF TIME WAITING FOR THIS REPORT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD GET NO RESPONSE IN THE PRESENT ROUND. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD MADE A CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO SHAPE A FUTURE INITIATIVE TO MAKE SURE IT WOULD ADVANCE THE NEGOTIATIONS. IF PARTICIPANTS WERE UNABLE TO EXCHANGE DATA IN THE PRESENT ROUND, THIS FACT COULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE THE OUTCOME AS REGARDS THE TIMING OF THE INITIATIVE.

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5. TARASOV SAID THE SOVIETS TOO SAW THE SITUATION AS DIS-APPOINTING. THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN PREPARED IN THEIR CASE TO MOVE FORWARD THROUGH TABLING THE DATA CALLED FOR IN THE 25 OCTOBER PROPOSAL. THE EASTERN REPS HAD HOPED WESTERN REPS WOULD AGREE AND THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD AS A RESULT BE ABLE TO START THE EXCHANGE IMMEDIATELY. FRANKLY, EASTERN REPS HAD NOT EXPECTED THE RESERVATIONS AND PRECONDITIONS WHICH WESTERN REPS HAD RAISED IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF NOVEMBER 9. IT WAS NOT THE FAULT OF THE EAST THAT THESE STATEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE AND CREATED NEW COMPLICATIONS.

6. US REP SAID IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO GO OVER OLD GROUND. FOR HIS PART, HE HAD NOT EXPECTED THE AIR MANPOWER ISSUE TO REPRESENT ANY GREAT PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIETS. IT SEEMED POSSIBLE EITHER THAT AN EARLY SOLUTION COULD BE REACHED OR THAT THE ISSUE COULD BE DEALT WITH LATER. THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM WAS THAT WESTERN REPS HAD REPORTED A FORMULA TO THEIR AUTHORITIES AND MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MOVE RAPIDLY IF THE SOVIETS HAD ENDORSED IT. NOW, THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES MADE IT HARD TO FIGURE OUT WHAT COULD BE DONE NEXT BECAUSE IT WAS DESIRABLE TO RESERVE THE CHANCE OF MOVING TO AN ACTUAL

DATA EXCHANGE IN THE PRESENT ROUND.

7. US DEP REP POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD TO ACCEPT A GOOD DEAL OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT SITUATION. SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAD PRESENTED THEIR POSITION

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ON THE EXCHANGE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN AN AMBIGUOUS WAY. THEY HAD NOT MADE CLEAR IN PRESENTING THEIR OCTOBER 25 RESPONSE THAT THE EAST EXPECTED AN EXCHANGE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER WITHIN THE SAME TIME PERIOD AS THE EXCHANGE OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. CONSEQUENTLY, WESTERN REPS HAD NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO INFORM THEIR AUTHORITIES OF THIS SPECIFIC POINT. SECOND, THE SOVIETS HAD LET SEVERAL WEEKS EXPIRE BETWEEN MAKING THEIR PROPOSAL REGARDING THE MODALITIES OF EXCHANGE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER AND INFORMING US REPS THAT THEY NO LONGER EXPECTED A POSITIVE RESPONSE ON THIS PROPOSAL FROM THEIR AUTHORITIES. ALL OF THIS HAD WASTED A GREAT DEAL OF TIME.

8. TARASOV SAID PARTICIPANTS STILL HAD THE POSSIBILITY OF OVERCOMING THE DIFFERENCES IN THEIR POSITIONS. IF THE WESTERN SIDE DESIRED, THE EAST WAS IN A POSITION TO EXCHANGE DATA BEFORE THE END OF THE ROUND. US REP ASKED TARASOV WHAT HE HAD IN MIND IN THIS REGARD.

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9. TARASOV SAID WESTERN REPS COULD CLEARLY EXPRESS THEIR AGREEMENT TO TAKE AS A BASIS OF DISCUSSION OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF FORCES THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF 25 OCTOBER. IN RETURN, WESTERN REPS COULD PRESENT AIR FIGURES IN ANY COMPOSITION CONVENIENT FOR THEM. US REP ASKED TARASOV TO GIVE FURTHER DETAILS AS REGARDS HIS VIEWS ON THE MODALITIES OF EXCHANGE OF AIR MANPOWER.

10 TARASOV SAID HE SAW THREE POSSIBILITIES. THE FIRST WAS THE MOST SIMPLE AND CONVENIENT. WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD PRESENT A SINGLE FIGURE FOR THE AIR MANPOWER OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT. SECOND, WESTERN COUNTRIES COULD PRESENT A FIGURE FOR ITS AIR MANPOWER AND THE WEST COULD ALSO PRESENT A SINGLE FIGURE FOR AIR MANPOWER ASSIGNED TO MULTILATERAL HEAD-QUARTERS. THIRD, THE WEST COULD PRESENT AIR DATA IN THE FORM IT HAS PREPARED FOR EXCHANGE OF MAJOR FORMATIONS AND OTHERS PLUS A FIGURE FOR MULTILATERAL HEADQUARTERS. IN EACH OF THESE CASES, THE EAST WOULD PRESENT A SINGLE FIGURE FOR THE AIR MANPOWER OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT. US REP SAID HE SAW TWO PROBLEMS IN THIS. FIRST, OBJECTIVELY, IN THE SEARCH FOR THE DISCREPANCY IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE EAST TO DIVIDE THEIR AIR MANPOWER AS WEST HAD SUGGESTED. SECOND, WESTERN INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRED RECIPROCITY IN THE FORM OF THE AIR MANPOWER DATA EXCHANGE AS WELL AS GROUND MANPOWER. US DEP REP SAID THE SOVIETS SHOULD MAKE A STATEMENT SAYING THEY WERE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF DIVIDING AIR MANPOWER AS THE WEST HAD PROPOSED AND WOULD GIVE A REPLY IN THE NEXT ROUND. TARASOV SAID HE WAS NOT NOW IN A POSITION TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBDIVIDING AIR MANPOWER.

11. US REP SAID HE THOUGHT A REASONABLE SOLUTION IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE FOR EACH SIDE TO SUBMIT A SINGLE OVERALL
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FIGURE FOR ITS AIR MANPOWER DATA PLUS A COMMITMENT TO SUBMIT FURTHER SUBDIVIDED AIR FORCE DATA IN THE NEXT ROUND. TARASOV SAID THAT PARTICIPANTS ALREADY HAD THESE FIGURES FOR BOTH SIDES AND THERE WAS NO POINT IN THIS. US REPS ARGUED THAT THIS WAS THE MOST EQUITABLE SOLUTION. AFTER ALL, IT WAS THE SOVIETS WHO HAD CAUSED THE PRESENT PROBLEM. TARASOV RESPONDED THAT IF THE WEST WAS NOT ABLE TO PRESENT FIGURES ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER BEFORE THE END OF THIS ROUND, IT WOULD PROBABLY MAKE SENSE TO COME BACK TO THE ENTIRE DATA ISSUE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND AND NOT TO

EXCHANGE ANY DATA NOW. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH THIS OUTCOME BECAUSE IT HAD COME TO THE PRESENT ROUND PREPARED WITH THESE FIGURES. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD EXPENDED MUCH EFFORT IN GAINING ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL IN MOSCOW AND IN COORDINATING IT WITH THEIR ALLIES. THEY HAD DONE SO BECAUSE THEY HAD HOPED THAT DATA EXCHANGE ACCORDING TO THEIR PROPOSAL WOULD PROVIDE A GOOD IMPETUS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. MOREOVER, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE THE EXCHANGE OF DATA IN THE PRESENT ROUND, WHICH WOULD PERMIT BOTH SIDES TO RETURN TO THEIR CAPITALS AND ANALYZE THE DATA IN THE RECESS.

12. TARASOV SAID HE WISHED TO REPEAT THAT THE EASTERN DELEGA-

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TIONS HAD NOT EXPECTED IN MAKING THIS PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 25, WHICH AVOIDED THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL FIGURES, THAT THE WESTERN SIDE WOULD HAVE SUCH DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING THE EASTERN PROPOSAL AS THE SITUATION EMERGED.

13. US REP SAID WEST HAD INFORMED THE EAST IN MAKING THE JULY 15 PROPOSAL THAT AIR FORCE DATA SHOULD BE SUBDIVIDED IN A WAY SIMILAR TO GROUND FORCE DATA. THEREFORE, THIS REQUIREMENT, WHEN PRESENTED ON NOVEMBER 9 BY WESTERN REPS, COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ANY SURPRISE TO THE EAST.

14. SHUSTOV SAID WEST HAD PROVIDED NO FURMULA WHICH THE EAST COULD HAVE USED TO SUBDIVIDE ITS AIR MANPOWER. SHUSTOV THEN MADE A VERY STRONG PITCH FOR EXCHANGE OF AIR MANPOWER IN WHICH WEST WOULD TABLE SINGLE FIGURE FOR EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT PLUS MULTILATERAL HEADQUARTERS AND EAST WOULD TABLE A SINGLE FIGURE. THIS WAS THE ONLY PRACTICAL WAY OUT. IT WOULD NOT DAMAGE THE WESTERN POSITION, SINCE THE FIGURES

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FOR MULTILATERAL HEADQUARTERS WOULD BE TABLED BOTH FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCES. THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY TO BRING ABOUT AGREEMENT AND CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EXCHANGE OF DATA IN THE PRESENT ROUND.

15. US DEP REP, HAVING IN MIND PREVIOUS CONVERSATION WITH FRG REP IN WHICH LATTER HAD SAID THAT BONN WAS CATEGORICALLY OPPOSED TO THE ABOVE SOLUTION, STATED THAT ONLY THE THIRD POSSIBILITY DESCRIBED BY TARASOV WAS A POSSIBILITY. IF THIS WER FOLLOWED, THE WEST WOULD TABLE TWO FIGURES FOR THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT, EXCEPT CANADA AND LUXEMBOURG, DIVED ACCORDING TO THE FORMULA THE WEST HAD ALREADY GIVEN THE EAST BETWEEN PERSONNEL IN MAJOR FORMATIONS AND OTHERS, PLUS A SINGLE FIGURE FOR THE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO MULTILATERAL HEADQUARTERS. THE EAST SHOULD STATE THAT IT IS READY TO STUDY THE WESTERN FORMULA FOR SUBDIVIDING AIR MANPOWER AND GIVE A REPLY LATER. THE EAST SHOULD PROPOSE NO FURTHER CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND FOR DATA.

16. TARASOV ASKED WHAT ABOUT THE FIRST STATEMENT WHICH HE HAD PROPOSED SHOULD BE MADE THAT PARTICIPANTS ACCEPTED THE OCTOBER 25 PROPOSAL AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER DATA EXCHANGE. US REP SAID ANY EXCHANGE WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHOUT CONDITIONS ON EITHER SIDE AS TO THE FUTURE DISCUSSION. THE WEST WOULD BE WILLING TO MENTION THAT IT WAS STUDYING THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ON MANNING LEVELS. THE EAST COULD STATE IT WAS STUDYING THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ON SUBDIVIDING AIR MANPOWER.

17. TARASOV SAID THAT HIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT REFLECTED IN THIS FORMULATION. HE HAD PROPOSED THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD SAY THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ACCEPTED THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 25 AS A BASIS OF DISCUSSION. US DEP REP REMINDED TARASOV THAT TARASOV HAD ALREADY MAKE THIS PROPOSAL TO US REPS

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ON NOVEMBER 22 AND THAT TARASOV HAD, AT THIS TIME, INCLUDED A

SECOND STATEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO LIMITATIONS AS TO FUTURE TACTICS OF EITHER SIDE. IT WAS QUITE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE WEST TO ACCEPT AN ISOLATED REFERENCE TO THE EAST'S OCTOBER 25 PROPOSAL WITHOUT MAKING CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO PRECONDITION. TARASOV SAID THE WHOLE SITUATION WOULD BE QUITE SIMPLE AND EASY IF THE WEST HAD AGREED TO EXCHANGE DATA ON THE BASIS OF THE EAST'S PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 25. INSTEAD, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD MADE THEIR STATEMENT OF 9 NOVEMBER, IN WHICH THEY HAD RAISED A NUMBER OF PRECONDITIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EXCHANGE OF DATA AND THE DISCUSSION OF DATA WOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF JULY 15 AND THE EASTERN RESPONSE AND THAT IN THE COURSE OF THIS DISCUSSION, THE WEST RESERVED THE RIGHT TO PUT QUESTIONS ON INDIVIDUAL FORMATIONS AND TO PROPOSE FURTHER DISAGGREGATION AND SO ON. THE EAST COULD NOT AGREE WITH PUTTING THE ISSUE IN SUCH A WAY. IT NOW APPEARED NECESSARY FOR THE EAST TO PILE UP ITS RESERVATIONS ON THE WESTERN RESERVATIONS. AS A RESULT PARTICIPANTS COULD GET LOST IN THIS INTRINSICALLY SIMPLE ISSUE. IN ORDER NOT TO FIND THEMSELVES IN SUCH A POSITION, THE EAST BELIEVED IT NECESSARY TO AGREE THAT THE EXCHANGE OF MANPOWER DATA

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AND THEIR DISCUSSION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT ON THE BASIS OF THE EASTERN COMPROMISE PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 25. THIS WAS MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE EAST THAN THE AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF

HOW TO EXCHANGE AIR FORCE MANPOWER DATA. US DEP REP SAID TARASOV WAS TRYING TO DESCRIBE A POSSIBLE FORMULA. BUT HE WAS LEAVING OUT THE OTHER PART OF THE FORMULA WHICH HE HAD EARLIER PROPOSED HIMSELF. SECOND, TARASOV WAS MAKING TOO MUCH OF AN ISSUE OUT OF THIS WHOLE AFFAIR AND BLOWING IT UP TO MAJOR PROPORTIONS. THERE WAS NO PRACTICAL NEED FOR ANY STATEMENT. WHY DID HE ATTACH SUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE PROBLEM?

18. TARASOV SAID HE COULD EXPLAIN THIS. THE SITUATION WAS THAT, ACCORDING TO THE EASTERN APPROACH, BEFORE AN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC CONCEPT OF REDUCTIONS WAS REACHED, THERE WAS NO NEED FOR EXCHANGE OF DATA. THIS WAS STILL THE EAST'S POSITION, AND THE COURSE OF EVENTS HAD PROVED IT CORRECT. ONLY BECAUSE OF THE PERSISTENT REQUIREMENT OF THE WESTERN SIDE HAD THE EAST PRESENTED ITS OWN FIGURES ON JUNE 10, 1976. NOW, THE
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WEST WAS INSISTING ON PRESENTATION OF NEW AND FURTHER NUMERICAL DATA IN MORE DETAILED FORM. THE EAST DID NOT NEED THE EXCHANGE OF THIS DATA AND THEIR DISCUSSION. THE EAST HAD ACCEPTED THE IDEA ONLY IN ORDER TO ENSURE A FORWARD MOVEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE EAST HAD ACCEPTED THIS EXCHANGE ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS DATA WOULD ESTABLISH A DEADLINE AND THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT INTRUDE ON THE QUESTION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF FORCES.

19. TARASOV SAID HE HAD ALREADY TOLD US REPS THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN AN EASY THING TO GET THE AGREEMENT OF HIS AUTHORITIES TO RELEASE THE NUMERICAL DATA EASTERN REPS NOW HAD AT THEIR DISPOSAL. SOVIET REPS HAD HAD TO CONVINCE THEIR AUTHORITIES THAT THE EAST SHOULD MAKE THE PRESENTATION OF THIS DATA, NATURALLY ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. SOVIET REPS HAD ASSURED THEIR AUTHORITIES THAT IN PRESENTING THIS DATA, THE EAST WOULD NOT GO FURTHER INTO A TYPE OF DATA DISCUSSION WHICH WOULD LEAD EASTERN REPS TOWARDS AN EXAMINATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF FORCES AND AWAY FROM SOLVING THE BASIC TASKS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. AT PRESENT, AS TARASOV SAW IT, IN THE WESTERN STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, INSTEAD OF THE WEST'S SAYING OK, LET'S DISCUSS DATA ON THIS BASIS, THE WEST HAD INSTEAD SET FORTH THE PRECONDITION THAT THIS DATA EXCHANGE WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER STEPS. THUS, THE POSITION WHICH THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD DEFENDED IN MOSCOW APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN INCORRECT FROM THE OUTSET. IT WAS CLEAR, OF COURSE, THAT NO ONE COULD DEPRIVE ANYONE OF A RIGHT IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS TO SUBMIT ANY QUESTION AND TO RAISE ANY PROPOSAL. SOVIET REPS UNDERSTOOD THIS AS WELL AS WESTERN REPS. BUT WHEN WESTERN REPS IMMEDIATELY SET FORTH DIFFERENT PRECONDITIONS, THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE FOR THE EAST AND THROUGH SUCH PRECONDITIONS THE WEST ITSELF HAD CREATED THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES. NOW, SOVIET REPS BELIEVED PARTICIPANTS COULD DO ONLY ONE THING, THAT IS, TO LEAVE ON THE RECORD ALL

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THE POINTS STATED BY BOTH SIDES IN THE DISCUSSION -- NO WORDS WOULD BE DROPPED FROM THE SONG -- AND TO MAKE A STATEMENT, OF COURSE, IF NOT CONVENIENT FOR THE WEST TO MAKE A UNILATERAL ONE, THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO MAKE A BILATERAL STATEMENT THAT WEST AND EAST AGREED TO EXCHANGE NUMERICAL DATA AND TO CARRY OUT THEIR DISCUSSION ON THE BASIS OF THE COMPROMISE PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 25. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD BE WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO ANY SIDE AND WOULD NOT CONTAIN ANY PRECONDITIONS FROM EITHER SIDE.

20. TARASOV THEN INDICATED THE POINT WHICH APPEARS AS POINT E OF THE PROPOSED DECLARATION. THEREAFTER HE DICTATED THE POINT WHICH APPEARS AS POINT 3 OF THE PROPOSED DECLARATION. TARASOV THEN SUGGESTED READ QUOTE WITH REGARD TO THE FURTHER EXCHANGE OF DATA, PARTICIPANTS HAVE AGREED TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS REFLECTING SUGGESTIONS MADE IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 25, 1977 UNQUOTE AND A FINAL PARAGRAPH WHICH READ QUOTE IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS EXCHANGE IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE OVERALL POSITIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS UNQUOTE.
21. US REP SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE.

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HE SAW THREE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS ON THIS ASPECT: (1) EITHER NOT MENTION EITHER THE OCTOBER 25 PROPOSAL OR THE WEST'S NOVEMBER 9 PROPOSAL; (2) TO MENTION BOTH PROPOSALS; AND (3) TO MAKE SOME MENTION OF THE OCTOBER 25 PROPOSAL AND TO INCLUDE THE PHRASE QUOTE OR FUTURE ACTIONS UNQUOTE AFTER THE WORDS QUOTE POSITIONS UNQUOTE IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH.

22. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION, TARASOV INSISTED THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE TERM QUOTE FUTURE ACTIONS UNQUOTE BECAUSE OF THE CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT IT REFERRED TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF JULY 15 TO EXCHANGE DATA ON MAJOR FORMATIONS. HE AGAIN STATED THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT NO LIMITATION COULD BE PLACED ON THE RIGHT OF PARTICIPANTS TO FOLLOW THE TACTICS THEY CHOSE OR TO RAISE ANY QUESTION THEY WISHED AND THAT THIS FREEDOM COULD BE PROTECTED BY USE OF THE PHRASE QUOTE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS UNQUOTE. ON THIS UNDERSTANDING, US REP SAID HE WAS WILLING TO CLOSE DISCUSSION ON THE TEXT AND REPORT IT TO HIS COLLEAGUES FOR DISCUSSION. THE TEXT READS AS FOLLOWS:
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QUOTE

1. WITH REGARD TO THE FURTHER EXCHANGE OF DATA, PARTICIPANTS HAVE AGREED TO TAKE IN THE PRESENT ROUND THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS REFLECTING SUGGESTIONS MADE IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 25, 1977, AS WELL AS FIGURES PROPOSED IN THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION:

A. OVERALL FIGURES FOR THE GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN MAJOR FORMATIONS OF THE WESTERN AND THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND A SECOND OVERALL FIGURE FOR OTHER PERSONNEL OF THESE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL BE EXCHANGED.

B. THE WEST WILL PRESENT A FIGURE FOR ITS GROUND PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO MULTILATERAL HEADQUARTERS.

C. DATA ON THE GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN MAJOR FORMATIONS OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CANADA AND LUXEMBOURG, WILL BE EXCHANGED.

D. FIGURES FOR THE REMAINING GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT WILL BE EXCHANGED.

E. THE SIDES WILL EXCHANGE DATA ON THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER FOR EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATE PRESENTING THOSE DATA IN A FORM WHICH EACH OF THE SIDES DEEMS MOST EXPEDIENT FOR ITSELF.

2. WITH RESPECT TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE
DATA ON THE MANNING LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WHOSE IMPORTANCE HAS BEEN STRESSED
BY THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES
STATED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WILL BE CAREFULLY STUDIED AND THAT A
REPLY TO IT WILL BE MADE SUBSEQUENTLY.

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3. WITH RESPECT TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL TO DIVIDE FOR
EACH PARTICIPANT THE DATA ON ITS AIR FORCE MANPOWER,
WHOSE IMPORTANCE HAS BEEN STRESSED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES,
EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES STATED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WILL BE
CAREFULLY STUDIED AND THAT A REPLY TO IT WILL BE MADE
SUBSEQUENTLY.

4. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS EXCHANGE IS WITHOUT PREJU-
DICE TO THE OVERALL POSITION OF THE PARTICIPANTS AND IS
WITHOUT PRECONDITION FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS. UNQUOTE

23. US REP POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY AN
OUTCOME WHICH HE WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES AND
WOULD INFORM TARASOV. TARASOV AGREED TO DO THE SAME WITH HIS
EASTERN COLLEAGUES.

24. THE EAST AGREED THAT THE NEXT INFORMAL SESSION
WOULD BE HELD ON DECEMBER 6 ON SUBJECTS OTHER THAN DATA AND
THAT, IF WESTERN AUTHORITIES AGREED TO THE EXCHANGE OF DATA

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2530

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0657

ON THE BASIS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION A FURTHER INFORMAL COULD BE HELD LATER IN THE SAME WEEK FOR EXCHANGE OF GROUND FORCE DATA AND THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE DATA PRIOR TO EXCHANGE OF AIR FORCE DATA BEFORE THE END OF THE ROUND.

25. ON DECEMBER 2, SHUSTOV INFORMED US DEP REP THAT THE SOVIETS HAD HELD DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED TEXT WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES, WHO HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE WITH THIS PAPER. US DEP REP SAID HE HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO ADD AT THIS TIME BUT WOULD INFORM SHUSTOV OF THE REACTION OF MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP.

26. ON DECEMBER 2, THE US REP INFORMED THE AD HOC GROUP OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSION AND ITS OUTCOME, WHICH WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A FORTHCOMING REPORT TO THE COUNCIL. RESOR

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, MILITARY PLANS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 03-Dec-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977MBFRV00657
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770451-0453
Format: TEL
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19771297/aaaaddzl.tel
Line Count: 625
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
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Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 MBFR VIENNA 653
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 371248
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: SECOND SOVIET BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS OF DECEMBER 1, 1977
TAGS: PARM, US, UR, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/89a9d70c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009